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As Others See Us
PAYMENT OF CORPUS WHEN YOUNGEST GRAND-
CHILD REACHES TWENTY-FIVE AS WITHIN
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The Michigan Law Review of March, 1931, volume 29,
number 5, page 642 has the following comment on a recent
Pennsylvania decision.
"T devised all his real and personal property to his
wife and daughter with right to use the income for life;
portion remaining on their death in trust until youngest
grandchild should reach 25, when. any then living should
receive the corpus; in default of such remaindermen, to pass
to others named. There was one grandchild living at T's
death. Held, no violation of the rule against perpetuities,
for grandchildren would take vested remainders. Endsley v.
Hagey, 301 Pa. 158, 151 Atl. 799.
"It is not necessary to discuss the problem as to whether
a legal contingent remainder is within the rule against per-
petuities, for this is an equitable remainder. See 28 Mich.
L. Rev. 455. Whether this is a vested or contingent re-
mainder is a more difficult problem than whether it is
within the rule against perpetuities. The court found there
was a vested remainder in the living grandchild subject to
open for after-born children. It should be noted that under
the court's construction (though nowhere expressly stated)
there is a divesting of each grandchild's share only if all
die before 25, and no divesting of those dying under 25 in
favor of each other (no cross-remainders), This inference
is justified in that the court does not discuss the problem of
cross-remainders, and in view of the distinction drawn be-
tween this case and the case of Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. 390,
62 Att. 1103. Such a construction by the court avoids the
perpetuity problem, for each grandchild's share is de-
termined at the life tenant's death. The court could argue:
(1) "when any then living" referred to the time of dis-
tribution and did not attach to the substance of the gift;
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(2) the fact that there is no express grant will not, as a
matter of law, prevent an immediate vesting. Belfield v
Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 Atl. 585; Anthony v. Anthony, 55
Conn. 256, 11 Atl. 45. (2) If a construction is open that
will avoid an illegal perpetuity, the court should take it.
Wolfe v. Hatheway, 81 Conn. 181, 70 Atl. 645; Wengerd's
Estate, 143 Pa. 615, 22 Ati. 869. But the only gift is the
direction to pay. An application of the "divide and pay
over" rule would declare this a contingent remainder.
Kales, Future Interests, 2d ed., sec. 500. It seems more
reasonable that "when any then living" means that only
those living when the youngest reaches 25 should take, and
that the class is not determined until that time. If that
is the true meaning, it would seem to be a contingent re-
mainder. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3d ed., sec. 369;
Taylor v. Crosson 11 Dcl. Ch. 145, 98 Atl. 375; Lawrence v.
Smith, 163 Ill. 149, 45 N. E. 259; Mockbee v. Grooms, 300
Mo. 446, 254 S. W. 170; Gillen v. Hadley, (N. 1. 1930) 150
Atl. 779. The fact that the grandchildren receive no in-
come is some indication of a contingent remainder.
Kales, Future Interests, 2d ed., sec. 510, 511. Clearly, if we
were to hold this a contingent remainder we would have a
violation of the rule against perpetuities, for it is possible
that a child might be born to the daughter of T after T's
death, and that such child would not reach 25 within 21
years after his mother's death. It is, of course, arguable
that there is a vested remainder in the living grandchild,
subject to open for after-born grandchildren; subject to
divest as to those dying under 25 in favor of survivors
(cross-remainders) ; subject to divest to others named if no
grandchild reaches 25. This seems even closer to T's in-
tent than the construction of the court except that there is
no provision in the will for cross-remainders. This con-
struction involves a violation of the rule against perpetu-
ities. It is true that no child can be born after the daugh-
ter's death and that-the minimum share of any grandchild
is then determined. But if there is a divest in favor of
survivors (cross-remainders) the maximum share is pos-
sibly not determined until 25 years after the daughter's
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death. So the class is not ascertainable within the period
required by the rule, and this is the one exception to the
rule that a vested remainder is not within the rule against
perpetuities. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3d ed., sec.
110a, 205a; Jarman on Wills, 7th ed., 303; In Re Gage, (1898)
1 Ch. 498. It is also to be noted that "such", in view of
"youngest grandchild", can not mean only those living at
T's death, as there was only one then living. It might pos-
sibly apply to those living at the life tenant's death but this
would only cut off the devise over when there were grand-
children living at that time, and would not cause the max-
imum share of each grandchild to be ascertained within
the period. In England, when the person making the will
dies after 1925 there would be a substitution of 21 for 25,
and no difficulty as to the rule against perpetuities. Law
of Property Act, (15 Geo. 5. c. 20, sec. 163)."
